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Abstract 
This paper provides a synthesis review of current knowledge on patterns, drivers, and 
rates of change in historical energy technology transitions. Next to a historical review, 
also a synthesis of the corresponding futures scenario literature is given. 
The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications for the possible emergence of 
a clean-technology cluster and for technology innovation policy. 
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Lessons from the history of technology and global change for 
the emerging clean technology cluster 
Charlie Wilson & Arnulf Grubler 
1. Introduction 
Technological change is widely recognized as the main driver of long-run economic 
growth (Solow 1957) and of development in general (Freeman & Perez 1988). 
Contrasting perspectives persist on the relationship between technological, institutional 
and social change. "Technological determinism" depicts technology as the main agent 
of change. "Social constructivism" depicts the shaping of the technological landscape by 
social forces. The perspective of this paper is that these dichotomies cloud complex 
inter-dependencies. Technologies and their institutional and social settings co-evolve. 
Change in these different arenas is mutually dependent, mutually enhancing, mutually 
dampening. Regardless of these particular perspectives, all scholars agree on the 
importance of technological change in historical energy transitions and on future 
scenarios of energy system transformation (Grubler 1998; Nakicenovic et al. 2000; Smil 
2003; Halsnæs et al. 2007). 
Studies of past energy transitions, as well as technological successes stories, provide 
many insights relevant to the challenges ahead which include: mitigating climate 
change; providing universal access to modern forms of energy; ensuring secure markets 
and supply chains; reducing air pollution and human health impacts (GEA 2011). 
Meeting these challenges will require wholesale transformation for which innovation 
and technological change are integral. Clean technology innovations range from 
incremental improvements to radical breakthroughs and from technologies and 
infrastructure to social institutions and individual behaviors. The innovation process 
involves many stages from research and development (‘R&D’), through incubation, 
demonstration, and (niche) market creation, to ultimate widespread diffusion. Feedbacks 
between these stages influence progress and likely success; innovation outcomes are 
inescapably uncertain. Innovations do not happen in isolation; inter-dependence and 
complexity are the rule not the exception. A narrow emphasis on particular technologies 
or parts of the energy system (e.g., a renewable energy supply) or technology policies 
that emphasize only particular innovation stages or processes (e.g., a ‘Manhattan 
project’ of energy R&D) is inappropriate. An approach to innovation is needed which is 
systemic and integrated. In the context of the energy system, this means supply and 
demand, laboratory and market, input and output, business and policy. 
This paper reviews historical evidence on the dynamics and characteristics of 
technological change and diffusion, focusing on the energy system (Section 2). 
Alongside this historical emphasis is an analysis of how technological change is 
represented in future scenarios (Section 3). Both sources of evidence will be used to 
draw implications for the ongoing development and diffusion of clean energy 
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technologies. Important differences in context and needs mean global and universal 
policy prescriptions are inappropriate. Rather, generic policy design criteria are 
recommended to support effectively functioning clean technology innovation systems 
(Section 4). 
2. Historical dynamics of technology & global change 
2.1. Historical energy transitions in industrialized and developing 
countries  
Global energy use has grown by a factor of 25 over the past 200 years. This increase, far 
in excess of the roughly 7-fold increase in population over the same period, constitutes 
the first major energy transition, a transition from penury to abundance. The transition 
in the quantity of energy use is closely linked to corresponding transitions in the quality 
of energy used and the structure of the energy system. Both quantitative and qualitative 
transitions have been driven to a large extent by technological change. And both are far 
from complete. Some two billion people continue to rely on traditional patterns of 
energy use: non-commercial biomass as the principal source of energy; no access to 
electricity; and levels of energy use characteristic of pre-industrial societies (some 20-
50 GJ primary energy/capita that delivers only some 2-5 GJ/capita in terms of useful 
energy services due to the inefficiency of traditional biomass use).  
Figure 1 illustrates the historical energy transition in terms of energy use quantities for 
industrialized and developing countries - the minimum degree of representation of 
spatial heterogeneity. Over the entire 20th century, energy use in industrialized countries 
has been persistently above the levels seen in developing countries despite accounting 
(currently) for only around one seventh of the global population. This situation reversed 
after 2000. Strong energy demand growth in developing countries, particularly China, 
coupled with stagnant, even slightly decreasing energy use in industrialized countries 
linked to the recession, have meant developing countries now account for over half of 
global energy use (276 EJ of a global total 530 EJ in 2009). Representative scenarios 
suggest that by 2100, developing countries could account for between two thirds to 
three quarters of total global energy use, anywhere from 300 to 2000 EJ. 
Although energy use has increased in both industrialized and developing countries over 
the past 200 years, the underlying driving forces have been radically different as shown 
in Figure 2. Historically, increasing energy use has been only weakly related to 
population growth. Nearly exponential increases in energy use in industrialized 
countries contrasts with comparatively modest, linear increases in population. In 
developing countries, the reverse is true: nearly exponential increases in population 
yielding – up to 1975 at least - only a linear increase in energy use. Only since 1975 
(and especially since 2000) has the increasing per capita energy use characteristic of 
industrialized countries added significantly to the impact of population growth on total 
energy demand in developing countries. These historical differences are explained by 
the nature of the industrialization process and the defining characteristic of 
industrialized countries—income growth, fuelled by technological change, leading to 
affluence and high levels of material (and energy) consumption. Indeed, disparities in 
the growth of energy use between industrialized and developing countries roughly 
mirror disparities in the growth of income as the two variables are linked. The historical 
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record suggests that many developing countries are now at the beginning of a long, 
decadal development path during which – setbacks notwithstanding – levels of energy 
use will increase as incomes rise. Conversely, in many (post-)industrialized countries, 
per capita energy use since 1975 has remained remarkably flat despite continuing 
growth in per capita income, suggesting an increasing decoupling of the two variables 
as a lasting impact of the ‘energy crises’ in the 1970s. 
 
Figure 1. Growth in Energy Use and Population (1800-2009). 
Notes: Primary energy use in EJ including non-commercial sources (columns, left-hand 
axis) and population in billions (lines, right-hand axis) for industrialised countries 
(white columns & markers) and developing countries (grey columns & markers) 
following UNFCCC distinctions between Annex 1 (industrialised) and non-Annex 1 
(developing) countries. Data from: (Grubler 2008) updated using (BP 2010; IEA 2010). 
Data prior to 1950 are estimates. 
 
Although the pattern of increasing energy use with economic development is pervasive, 
there is no unique and universal ‘law’ governing their relationship over time and across 
countries. The growth experiences of one country cannot necessarily be used to infer 
those of another. There is a persistent difference between development trajectories 
spanning the extremes of highly energy intensive (e.g., the United States) to highly 
energy efficient (e.g., Japan). The concept of ‘path dependency’ helps to explain these 
differences in energy use patterns among countries and regions even at comparable 
levels of income. Path dependency is discussed further in Section 2.5. As an illustrative 
example, initial differences in resource endowments or social configurations may 
become perpetuated and magnified over time by differences in economic activity, 
technology adoption rates, consumption patterns and infrastructure. These shape and 
constrain the nature and direction of technological change, further reinforcing the 
influence of past on future, and so the observed divergence between countries. 
What is clear, however, is that the challenges of a sustainable energy transition will 
have to be addressed across all regions, and particularly in developing countries. 
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Historically, the emphasis of energy-related development has begun by addressing 
energy poverty, then on building up infrastructure as part of industrialization, then on 
widening access, and finally on tackling the environmental externalities associated with 
growth in energy use and consumption (Grubler 1998). The major challenge for 
developing countries is how to move from this historical sequence to an integrated, 
concurrent approach dictated by the sheer magnitude of numbers as well as climate 
stabilization objectives (Metz et al. 2007). While the difficulties of such an integrated 
approach are significant, especially in view of capital constraints and often weak 
institutional capabilities, the benefits for a sustainable energy transition are substantial 
(GEA 2011). Technology and technology policy will be a key element, much as 
technological change has played a critical role in historical energy transitions. 
 
Figure 2. Growth in Per Capita Energy Use and Population (1800-2009). 
Notes: Population in billions (x-axis) vs. per capita energy use in GJ including non-
commercial sources (y-axis) in trajectories of 25 year intervals from 1800-2000 and 
updated to 2009 for industrialised countries (squares) and developing countries 
(triangles). Areas of squares connecting x-axis and y-axis coordinates (illustrated for 
1800 & 2009) are proportional to total energy use. Data from: (Grubler 2008) updated 
using (BP 2010; IEA 2010). Data prior to 1950 are estimates.  
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2.2. Historical energy technology transitions 
Two major transitions have shaped the structure of the global energy system and the 
qualitative dimension to energy use since the onset of the Industrial Revolution 
(Nakicenovic et al. 1998). The first is characterized by the emergence of steam power 
relying on coal that helped to overcome the constraints of pre-industrial energy systems 
including the limited availability of mechanical power, low energy densities, and the 
lack of ubiquitous and cheap transport systems (see also Landes 1969). This first energy 
technology transition took well over a century to unfold fully: between the late 18th 
century until the 1920s when coal-based steam power constituted well over two thirds 
of the global energy system. The second energy technology transition is characterized 
by the displacement of the previously dominating coal-based steam technology cluster 
by electricity (drives, light) and petroleum-based technologies (automobiles, aircraft, 
petrochemicals). As noted earlier, this second transition is far from completed: some 
two billion still lack access to modern energy services provided by electric appliances 
and end-use devices (GEA 2011). 
Both these historical energy technology transitions are characterized by various ‘grand’ 
patterns of technological change, each of which is discussed in depth in the sections that 
follow: 
i. end-use applications drive supply-side transformations; 
ii. performance dominates cost in the initial market niches; 
iii. technologies do not change individually, but cluster and ‘spillover’; 
iv. the time constants of technological change are long, decades not years; 
v. experimentation and learning precede ‘up-scaling’ and widespread diffusion; 
vi. the magnitude and rate of expansions in energy conversion capacity are 
inversely related; 
vii. diffusion in late adopter regions is faster than in initial innovator regions, but 
saturates at a lesser extent. 
2.3. End-use applications drive supply-side transformations 
The history of past energy transitions highlights the critical importance of end-use 
technologies, consumers and the demand for energy services such as heating, lighting, 
mobility and power. Historically, energy supply has followed energy demand in 
technology applications, and end-use markets have been the most important outlets for 
new energy technologies. Neither of the two major energy technology transitions since 
the Industrial Revolution were driven by resource scarcity or by direct economic signals 
such as prices, even if these exerted an influence at various times (Grubler 2008). It was 
not the scarcity of coal that led to the introduction of more expensive oil. Instead, these 
historical shifts were, first of all, technological, particularly at the level of energy end-
use. The diffusion of steam and gasoline engines, of electric motors and appliances can 
be considered the ultimate driver, triggering important innovation responses in the 
energy sector and leading to profound structural changes in the energy supply. 
Stationary steam engines in industry and agriculture, and mobile steam engines on ships 
and locomotives, were by far the dominant markets for this new technology. Small by 
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comparison were the coal mines, and coking and town gas plants, that represented the 
emerging cluster of a coal supply technology cluster based on complex chemistry and 
associated conversion technologies. In the case of electricity, it is no coincidence that 
the first innovation leaving Thomas Edison's R&D laboratory in Menlo Park was the 
incandescent light bulb. In the technology language of today, a demand innovation - the 
electric light bulb - triggered a host of supply-side innovations - electricity generation, 
transport and distribution.  
The size of end-use markets and the volume of applications also dwarf their supply-side 
counterparts. Table 1 summarizes the evolution of energy technologies in the US since 
1850. US data are used simply because of more reliable historical records than 
elsewhere. Although energy technologies are many and diverse, using a simple common 
metric such as installed power capacity data (here expressed in GW or 109 Watts) 
allows like for like comparisons. Table 1 differentiates between stationary and mobile 
end-use applications, as well as the supply-side energy sector applications, and further 
distinguishes three broad energy conversion categories: thermal (boilers, furnaces), 
mechanical (prime movers like steam engines or electric turbine-generators), and 
electrical (appliances, lights, and other specific, non-substitutable electricity uses like 
radios, TVs and computers). 
Table 1. Installed Capacity of Energy Technologies in the US (1850-2000). 
Data from: (US_DoC 1975; US_DoC 2007) apart from italicised numbers which are 
author’s first order estimates. For details, see (Grubler et al. 2011). 
Application Energy Conversion Category 
Installed Capacity (GW) 
1850 1900 1950 2000 
stationary 
end-use 
thermal (furnaces/boilers) 300 900 1,900 2,700 
mechanical (prime movers) 1 10 70 300 
electrical (drives, 
appliances) 
0 20 200 2,200 
mobile 
end-use 
animals/ships/trains/aircraft 5 30 120 260 
Automobiles 0 0 3,300 25,000 
stationary 
supply 
boilers (power plants) 0 10 260 2,600 
mechanical (prime movers) <1 3 70 800 
TOTAL (numbers rounded) 300 1,000 6,000 34,000 
 
Table 1 makes clear the overwhelming and persistent dominance of end-use 
applications in the total installed capacity base of energy technologies. By the 
beginnings of the US steam age in the 1850s, the dominant energy technologies were 
the simple conversion devices of ovens, furnaces and boilers which converted chemical 
energy in the forms of fuel wood and coal into heat. Horses were the dominant transport 
technology converting chemical energy (feed) into mechanical energy, with five-fold 
greater capacity than the first stationary steam engines. By 1900, close to the peak of the 
coal/steam transition, thermal conversion in boilers and furnaces accounted for 90 
percent of the 1,000 GW of installed conversion capacity in the US. A hundred years 
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later, this total had grown to some 34,000 GW or 120 kW per capita, 10 times the level 
of 1850. This spectacular expansion has been marked by the electrification of homes 
and industry, and the striking 1000-fold increase in energy conversion capacity enabling 
private mobility. Today, car and truck engines comprise nearly three quarters of all 
energy conversion capacity in the US, exceeding the thermal capacity of electric power 
plants by a factor of around 10 (giving rise to bold proposals for decentralized 
electricity generation by fuel cell powered road vehicles when parked). 
2.4. Performance dominates cost in initial market niches 
Initially, new technologies are attractive not cheap. New technologies when introduced 
are crude, imperfect, and expensive (Rosenberg 1994). Performance initially dominates 
economics as the driver of technological change. New energy technologies are attractive 
for their ability to perform a particular task or deliver a new or improved energy service. 
This is often circumscribed by a particular set of needs in a particular context: a market 
“niche”. End-users in such niches are generally less sensitive to the effective price of 
the energy service provided or have a higher willingness to pay for its performance 
advantages (Fouquet 2010). Costs will often only start to fall substantively after an 
extended period of commercial testing, learning, efficiency gains, and other incremental 
improvements. The concurrent establishment and growth of an industrial base drives 
costs down through standardization, mass production, and economies of scale. Only 
then are new technologies able to compete with incumbent technologies on a cost basis, 
driving their widespread diffusion.  
Initial steam engines were, by any standards, inefficient and extremely expensive. The 
first atmospheric steam engines had thermal conversion efficiencies of 1 percent only, 
consuming some 45 pounds of coal per horsepower delivered (Ayres 1989). It took a 
century to boost their thermal efficiency to around 20 percent in a successive stream of 
innovations (from Newcomen's atmospheric engine, to Watt's low pressure engine, to 
the high pressure engines that finally made railroads possible). It took another century 
again to reach the current steam turbine efficiency of 40 percent. The initial costs of 
steam engines in the mid 18th century amounted to a phenomenal US$12,000 per kW (in 
2003$) (Crafts 2004). Compared to today, the economy was also a factor of 130 smaller 
with per capita incomes a factor of 13 smaller, around US$1,500 (in 2003$). Yet despite 
their high inefficiency and high cost, the modest performance benefits of steam engines 
in terms of power output and density meant they began substituting for the incumbent 
power providers, horses and water (which, additionally, was often not available where 
needed). After an extended period of experimentation and development, costs of steam 
engines started to come down during the mid-19th century, 100 years after their 
introduction. By the beginning of the 20th century, costs had fallen to below US$3,000 
per KW (in 2003$). 
A similar pattern of new energy technologies being adopted despite initially extremely 
high costs is found in the introduction of electricity and electric appliances for light and 
motive power (Devine 1983; Smil 2000). Fouquet (2010) compares the drivers of 14 
different energy transitions in the means of providing heat, light, mobility and power in 
the UK over the past millennium. In the majority of cases, better or different energy 
services drove the transition: “The steam engine enabled entrepreneurs to boost 
production, not limited by humans or animals or by the location of flowing water. 
Electricity radically altered the production process from belts centrally driven by a 
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steam engine to numerous machines ... potentially controlled by the worker. Railways 
and cars transformed the provision of transport services, allowing a faster service and 
a more flexible and private form of transport respectively. Gas lighting was easier to 
use and less dangerous. Electric lighting was much easier to use.” (p6591-2, Fouquet 
2010). 
The 20th century trend in private mobility seen earlier in the US capacity data 
exemplifies a more generic pattern. Major energy transitions are associated with step-
changes in both the quality and the quantity of energy services provided through end-
use technologies. Though transitions may be catalyzed by innovations that create new, 
better or qualitatively different energy services, transitions are subsequently driven and 
sustained by dramatic falls in the effective cost of providing energy services. In turn, 
this sees a dramatic increase in the quantity of the service demanded (Fouquet & 
Pearson 2007; Fouquet 2010). A related characteristic of energy transitions is that 
efficiency gains are overwhelmed by this increase in service demand and a 
corresponding expansion in the volume and pervasiveness of end-use technologies 
(Haas et al. 2008). 
2.5. Technologies do not change individually but cluster and ‘spillover’ 
No individual technology is able to transform large and complex energy systems. The 
importance of single technologies arises in particular through two effects: “clustering” 
or combinations of inter-related technologies; and “spillovers” or applications outside 
the configuration, use or sector for which a technology was initially devised. In other 
words, technologies act more effectively as families or ‘gangs’, not as individuals. 
Technology researchers have introduced the concept of "general purpose" technologies 
to describe these synergies of technologies being deployed in a variety of applications 
and so further promoting knowledge spillovers and market growth, with corresponding 
economies of scale (Lipsey et al. 2005). Steam is a prominent historical example. 
Stationary steam engines were first introduced in the 18th century for dewatering coal 
mines. Stationary steam power subsequently spilled over to drive mechanization in 
manufacturing (e.g., textiles) and agriculture (e.g., threshing) and also to mobile 
applications such as railways and steamships. Perhaps the exemplar of a general 
purpose technology whose importance is founded on clustering and spillover effects is 
electricity, the "greatest engineering achievement of the 20th century" (US_NAE 2003). 
Information and communication technologies (ICTs) are the clearest current example of 
a general purpose technology (Basu & Fernald 2008), although unlike steam power and 
electricity they do not concern the energy supply. As such ICTs could drive services-led 
growth while leaving the basic structure of the energy system in tact (Moe 2010). 
Others, however, have argued for a more pervasive impact of ICTs on the energy 
system, exemplified by the ‘informated’ or smart grid concept of system management 
based on two-way flows of both information and power. 
Clustering is particularly evident in the mutual dependencies between energy 
conversion technologies and energy supply infrastructure and networks. Each of the 
major energy transitions in the UK since the 1300s were characterized by a change in 
energy source (e.g., horse to steam power, sail to steam ship transportation, candles to 
kerosene lighting); but each energy transition also involved major changes in the energy 
supply network, as well as the energy service provided (Fouquet 2010). 
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Clustering and spillover effects mean it is difficult to dislodge a dominant technological 
regime with its component technological systems and high sunk investment costs, but 
also a “congealed culture” of institutions, patterns of social organization, and behavioral 
routines and practices (Sovacool 2009). This is referred to in the technology literature as 
"lock-in” (e.g., Unruh 2000) and is described dynamically by the characteristics of “path 
dependency" (Arthur 1989). Path dependency helps explain the persistent differences in 
development trajectories between countries, controlling for the effects of income, from 
the energy intensive US to the energy efficient Japan. Path dependency in energy 
systems arises from differences in initial conditions (e.g., resource availability and other 
geographic, climatic, economic, social, and institutional factors) that in turn are 
perpetuated by differences in policy and tax structures, leading to differences in spatial 
structures, infrastructures, and consumption patterns (Grubler 2008). These in turn exert 
an influence on the levels and types of technologies used, both by end-users and within 
the energy supply. 
2.6. The time constants of technological change are long, decades not 
years 
The turnover of capital stock in the energy system ranges from many decades to well 
over a century (Grubler et al. 1999). It took steam power in the UK close to 100 years 
(to the 1860s) to gain a 50 percent market share in total installed horsepower, gradually 
displacing wind and waterpower (Crafts 2004). It took some 40 years (to the 1920s) for 
electric drives to account for 50% of all prime movers in US industry (Ausubel & 
Marchetti 1996). Substantial capital and labor productivity effects arose only after that 
threshold was passed (Devine 1983). In a range of UK energy transitions since the 
Industrial Revolution, the average time period from first commercialization to market 
dominance was around 50 years (Fouquet 2010). Including the period from invention to 
first commercialization extends this time constant to around 100 years. Energy 
transition dynamics at the global scale are significantly slower: ranging from 80 to 130 
years for new energy technology clusters to achieve market dominance, and about twice 
as long when considering the entire technology life cycle from first introduction to 
market maturity. 
So the process of technological change, from innovation to widespread diffusion, takes 
considerable time. But as rates of change become slower, the larger the energy system 
(components) affected and the more disruptive the consequences (Grubler 1996). 
Figure 3 summarizes the two major energy technology transitions globally: coal/steam 
replacing traditional biomass; and then modern energy technologies and carriers (oil, 
gas, and primary electricity from hydropower and nuclear) replacing coal/steam. The y-
axis shows market shares as a percent of total primary energy use for traditional fuels 
(brown), coal (grey), and modern energy carriers (red). The dashed lines show coupled 
logistic equations describing the period 1850-1975. Evident from Figure 3 are the long 
periods of slow and gradual market penetration of end-use and supply technologies 
alongside the observed substitution of energy sources (Marchetti & Nakicenovic 1979). 
The turnover or displacement times first of tradition fuels and then of coal are around 
130 years and 80 years respectively at the global level. Turnover times are measured 
here by the duration parameters of logistic diffusion and market substitution curves (the 
lines in Figure 3). A characteristic measure is the ∆t (delta t) which is the time taken to 
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grow from 1% to 50% or from 10% to 90% market share. The entire technology life 
cycle from 1% to 99% of the full market potential is therefore 2∆t. 
Also visible in Figure 3 is the significant slow-down of transition dynamics since 1975 
(with the model estimates for the second, post 1975 period shown as solid lines). This is 
largely due to the continuing role of coal for electricity generation. Although coal has a 
26% share of primary energy, it directly meets only 9% of final energy use (BP 2010; 
IEA 2010). The vast majority of this is in the heavy metallurgical industry - the last 
technological testimony to the 19th century coal/steam age. This significant slow-down 
in the rates of structural change in energy technology systems since the mid-1970s sits 
uneasily with the need for an accelerated technological transition in a climate 
constrained world. 
 
Figure 3. Two Grand Transitions in Global Energy Systems (1850-2008). 
Data from: (Grubler 2008) updated for 2008 (light shaded symobls) using (BP 2010; 
IEA 2010). Data prior to 1950 are estimates.  
 
The observed rates of transition in the energy system are influenced by various 
phenomena which, ceteris paribus, imply slower rates of change. These include: 
i. Capital intensiveness. Investments in energy technologies are among the most 
capital intensive across industries, characterized by high upfront costs, a high 
degree of specificity of infrastructure, long payback periods, and strong 
exposure to financial risk (IEA 2003). 
ii. Long capital stock lifetimes. Long-lived capital stock of energy systems in many 
end-use applications (buildings), conversion technologies (refineries, power 
plants), and above all infrastructures (railway networks, electricity grids) is high 
compared to other industrial equipment or consumer products (Smekens et al. 
2003; Worrell & Biermans 2005). Lifetimes span several decades to a century, 
reducing the rate of capital turnover, and thus slowing the diffusion of new 
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technologies particularly in developed countries where capital stock expansion is 
slower.  
iii. Formative periods. Initial imperfections and high costs of new technologies 
imply an extended period of experimentation, learning and technology 
development through the cycle of innovation, specialized niche market 
application, and finally - if successful - pervasive adoption across many sectors, 
markets and countries. 
iv. Spillover effects. Considerable time is needed for technology clustering and 
spillover effects to emerge, not just in inter-related technologies, but also in the 
organizational, institutional and social changes needed for technologies to 
realize their full productive potential. Using the electric dynamo as an example, 
David (1990) shows how the inter-relatedness between technologies, institutions 
and infrastructures creates lengthy ‘diffusion lags’ between first 
commercialization and pervasive adoption. 
2.7. Experimentation and learning precede up-scaling and widespread 
diffusion 
Widespread adoption of a technology follows an often extended period of 
experimentation during which the technology is iteratively tested, refined and adapted to 
market conditions. This has been termed the ‘formative phase’ of the technology’s 
lifecycle (Jacobsson & Lauber 2006) and characterizes the early stages of commercial 
diffusion. The lifecycle of some energy technologies - from invention and innovation 
through to widespread market adoption and eventual saturation - is further characterized 
by a process of ‘up-scaling’. The term ‘up-scaling’ is used here to mean an increase in 
the capacity of an individual technological unit to convert energy into a useful service. 
Up-scaling is often associated with economies of scale. In general terms, economies of 
scale describe reductions in average unit costs as the size of individual units (‘unit’ scale 
economies) or the volume of total production (‘manufacturing’ scale economies) 
increase over the long run, i.e., assuming all production inputs are variable.  
Figure 4 shows the ‘up-scaling’ dynamic for a range of energy technologies that have 
diffused over the course of the 20th century. Each line describes the changes over time 
of the average capacity in MW of newly installed ‘units’: steam turbine units in coal, 
gas and nuclear power plants; wind turbines in wind farms; jet engines in passenger 
aircraft; internal combustion engines in cars; and compact fluorescent light bulbs in 
lighting systems. 
Historically, the formative and up-scaling phases of energy technologies have tended to 
progress sequentially. Figure 5 shows more detailed data for coal power. The left-hand 
graph shows the number of steam turbine units built each year, along with their average 
and maximum unit capacities. These describe growth dynamics in terms of 
technological units. The right-hand graph shows the total capacity added each year as 
well as the steady growth over time of cumulative total capacity. These describe growth 
dynamics in terms of the whole industry. 
Figure 5 shows a clear overall sequence. For the first 50 years, slow growth in 
cumulative total capacity is driven by increasing numbers of units. Unit capacities 
remain low, with maximum unit capacities typically in the 10 – 50 MW range. During 
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the next 20 years, continued growth in cumulative total capacity is increasingly driven 
by a concentrated period of up-scaling which is preceded by a dramatic jump in the 
numbers of units. Maximum unit capacities increase to around 1000 MW; average unit 
capacities to around 250 MW. Over the course of the next 30 years, unit capacities vary 
somewhat around these saturation levels, but sustained growth in cumulative total 
capacity is driven again by increasing numbers of units. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Up-scaling in Selected Energy Technologies Since 1900. 
Notes: Lines show average capacity of new units in MW on log-scale y-axis. Data from: 
See graph legend and (Wilson forthcoming) for more details. 
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Figure 5. Growth in Coal Power Capacity Globally Since 1900. 
Notes: Left-hand graph shows unit capacities & numbers; right-hand graph shows 
capacity additions & cumulative total capacity. Data from: (Platts 2005); see (Wilson 
forthcoming-b) for details. 
 
The sequence observed in the expansion of coal power capacity is broadly consistent 
across all the eight energy technologies analyzed (see Figure 4) and in all regions as 
well as globally. This sequence in the growth dynamic of energy technologies is 
summarized as: 
i. a ‘formative phase’ of many smaller-scale units with only small increases in unit 
capacity; 
ii. an ‘up-scaling phase’ of large increases in unit capacities, particularly at the 
scale frontier, concurrent with an increase in numbers of units; 
iii. a ‘growth phase’ of large numbers of units at larger unit capacities. 
 
2.7.1. The formative phase and the role of experimentation 
The formative phase of a technology’s lifecycle describes the critical period between the 
early development of an innovation, and widespread commercial diffusion sustained by 
positive feedbacks or ‘cumulative causation’ (Jacobsson & Bergek 2004). During the 
formative phase, technologies are repeatedly and iteratively tested, modified, improved, 
reduced in cost, and adapted to market demands. As noted earlier, this often takes place 
in market niches which offer some protection from competitive pressures (Kemp et al. 
1998). Dosi (1988) includes experimentation as one of five integral characteristics of 
innovation along with uncertainty, scientific knowledge, complexity, and accumulation. 
Simply put, experimentation is “an iterative process of understanding what doesn’t 
work and what does”, encompassing both success and failure (p2, Thomke 2003). 
Experimentation allows technologies to be “debugged” through a process of “designing-
by-experience” (Ruttan 2001). This is particularly important for radical technologies 
introducing into the market non-incremental changes in design or service provision 
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(Utterback 1994; Suarez 2004). Entrepreneurialism to conduct “risky experiments 
necessary to cope with the large uncertainties that follow from new combinations of 
technological knowledge, applications and markets” is one of the key functions of 
innovation systems (p422, Hekkert et al. 2007). In this vein, experimentation is a means 
of “articulating” the designs, markets, policies, and end-user demands of a technology 
(Kemp et al. 1998). 
Figure 6 compares the growth dynamics of wind power in the same way as for coal 
power in Figure 5. The data are for onshore wind plants in Denmark, the pioneer market 
for widespread wind power commercialization. Complete time series data on maximum 
unit capacities are not available, but the commercial history of new turbine models 
developed by Vestas, the leading Danish (and global) manufacturer, is an approximation 
of the unit scale frontier. The resulting up-scaling of turbines is still far from saturation, 
particularly in the offshore segment for which 5MW and larger unit capacities are 
envisaged (GWEC 2008). 
 
Figure 6. Growth in Onshore Wind Capacity in Denmark Since 1977. 
Data from: (Danish_Energy_Agency 2008); see (Wilson forthcoming-b) for details. 
 
Wind power is an interesting example in this context because, like coal power, the 
availability of unit scale economies level might be expected to drive rapid up-scaling. 
Specifically, larger turbines allow longer blades with more than proportional increases 
in power output, and the further benefit of stronger, more laminar winds at higher hub 
heights.  Despite, this economic incentive for up-scaling, Figure 6 is notable for the 
formative phase from the late 1970s to the early 1990s characterized by the build out of 
many units of a relatively small and fairly constant unit size (though the first power 
generating wind turbines date back as far as the 19th century). This formative phase 
preceded the up-scaling of unit capacities through the late 1990s and early 2000s. In 
contrast, countries like Germany, Sweden, and Netherlands placed early emphasis on 
rapidly increasing turbine capacities to capture unit scale economies. In Sweden, for 
example, early government R&D emphasized up-scaling turbines to the 2 – 3 MW 
range in a context of uncertain market demand (Astrand & Neij 2006). This premature 
move to the up-scaling phase failed to build an enduring industry (relative to the Danish 
case) (Meyer 2007). As Heymann (1998) puts it: “The problems in wind technology 
development [in Germany and the US] demonstrate that the testing, design 
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improvement, and maturation of complex technologies require much practical 
experimentation and at least as much time, money, and effort as do the initial design 
and construction” (p667). This is also consistent with the finding that up-scaling occurs 
only once the fundamental design issues and trade-offs for a technology are settled 
(Sahal 1985; Frenken & Leydesdorff 2000). In this way, up-scaling is part of the 
process by which the ‘dominant design’ of a technology is incrementally adapted to 
service different market demands as part of its widespread commercial diffusion. 
Experimentation with many small-scale units contributes to a process of ‘learning-by-
numbers’ – or building many before building big. This is illustrated further by Table 2 
which compiles available data on five energy supply technologies in their initial markets 
(which vary geographically and in size). The right-hand column shows the length and 
number of units built during a formative phase which runs from first commercial 
application to the point at which new units reach 10% of the eventual scale frontier. 
This formative phase lasts decades, and sees the build out of hundreds of units. Nuclear 
power is the outlier with a relatively short formative phase and relatively few numbers 
of units built prior to up-scaling. But in fact, this exception supports the generalizable 
rule. The unit scale frontier of nuclear power increased five-fold in the decade that 
followed commissioning of the first 50 MW commercial reactor in 1956. Ultimately, 
these rapid increases in unit size were a contributing factor to the rising complexity that 
created diseconomies of scale and constrained further growth of the industry in the late 
1970s (Lovins et al. 2003; Grubler 2010). 
Table 2. Formative Phases of Energy Supply Technologies. 
Source: (Wilson forthcoming-b). 
Technology Initial Market 
First 
Commercial 
Capacity 
Installed 
10% of 
Saturation 
Capacity 
Reached 
Formative Phase: Number of 
Years & Number of Units 
Natural Gas 
Power 
OECD 1900s 1948 
50 years, 
>400 units 
Coal 
Power 
OECD 1900s 1950 
50 years, 
>775 units 
Nuclear 
Power 
OECD 
1950s 
(1940s*) 
1963 
10 years, 
25 units 
Wind 
Power 
Denmark 
1970s 
(1880s*) 
1987 
15-100 years, 
>1400 units 
Refineries** US 1860s-1870s (1948 - average 
capacity only) 
(80-90 years, 
>500 units?**) 
* First nuclear installations on submarines date to 1940s; first wind power generators date to 1880s, but 
from 1970s in their modern form. 
** Refineries data are indicative only. Saturation capacity measured in terms of average rather than 
maximum capacities; number of units are rough estimate. 
 
Finally, it is important to note that the knowledge generated and experience 
accumulated in the formative phase is neither automatic nor autonomous. In the Danish 
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case, learning was facilitated by efforts to ensure experiences fed back into subsequent 
designs through relationships between industry actors supported by public investments 
in, for example, testing infrastructure (Garud & Karnoe 2003). This policy-supported 
process of collective learning was absent in other countries which subsequently failed to 
develop a viable domestic technological capability and industry (Neij & Andersen 
forthcoming). 
2.7.2. The up-scaling phase and the importance of market niches 
Although the basic sequence from formative phase to up-scaling phase to industry 
growth phase is generalizable, growth dynamics at the unit scale vary (see Figure 4). 
Two characteristics help explain differences in observed rates of up-scaling: unit scale 
economies, and heterogeneous markets. In general: 
i. Up-scaling occurs more rapidly (and over a shorter timeframe) for technologies 
with strong unit scale economies: e.g., coal power, nuclear power. 
ii. Up-scaling occurs less rapidly (and over a longer timeframe) for technologies 
servicing heterogeneous or dispersed markets: e.g., natural gas power, jet 
aircraft. 
The potential tension between these two drivers are played out in the case of wind 
power as discussed above in the Danish context, but more clearly with natural gas 
power whose scale independence in terms of technical efficiency has meant applications 
spanning distributed units in the kW range up to centralized combined cycle 
configurations in the 100s of MW or even GW range (Lee 1987). The demand context 
for each technology thus determines the appropriateness of different unit scales. In 
general, market niches are more heterogeneous for distributed end-use technologies than 
for centralized supply-side technologies. End-use technologies (e.g., aircraft, light 
bulbs) supply a particular energy service (e.g., mobility, illumination) in a wide variety 
of contexts. As an example, the diversity of lighting services requires bulbs ranging in 
capacity over 5 orders of magnitude, from several watts (LEDs) to over 10kW for 
specialized exterior lighting (metal halide lamps) (IEA 2006). By comparison, the 
successful commercialization of modular end-use technologies (e.g., cars, light bulbs) in 
the 20th century has been associated with mass production and manufacturing scale 
economies (at least since the model T Ford). 
Conversely, energy supply and conversion technologies (e.g., refineries, power plants) 
produce one or a small number of homogeneous energy carriers (e.g., liquid 
transportation fuels, electricity). These are subsequently distributed to the point of use. 
With transmission networks and reasonable proximity to concentrated demand centers, 
electricity generation has historically been characterized by strong unit scale economies 
and rapid up-scaling of unit capacities (see Figure 4). In the case of nuclear power, the 
unique issues associated with managing nuclear fuel cycles coupled with the need to 
reduce capital costs drove rapid up-scaling at the unit level from the mid-1960s to mid-
1970s following a relative short formative phase (see Table 2). The build out of large 
capacity units continued until the late 1980s after which growth saturated. In refineries, 
up-scaling is concentrated during the several decades following World War II which is 
concurrent with the growth phase of the industry in total capacity terms (though data at 
the unit level are only available for the US in terms of average capacity, and only from 
1940 onwards). Increases in unit capacities largely saturated by the 1970s; industry 
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capacity expansion similarly plateaus following the oil shocks. As the largest capacity 
end-use technology, jet aircraft also exhibited rapid and early up-scaling. First 
introduced commercially in 1958 with the Boeing 707-100, up-scaling was largely 
completed by the introduction of the Boeing 747-100 in 1969 (see Figure 4, right-hand 
graph). This took place during the first 10 years of a 50 year period of continual growth 
in numbers of units. The recent introduction of the larger Airbus A380 has only 
marginally pushed up the unit scale frontier. 
2.8. The magnitude and rate of expansions in energy conversion 
capacity are inversely related 
Intuitively, a technology should take longer to diffuse to a greater extent; or, as noted 
earlier, the more pervasive the diffusion, the slower the process (Grubler 1996). So the 
extent and duration of growth should be positively correlated, notwithstanding the many 
factors that affect growth dynamics (Grübler et al. 1999). The relationship between the 
extent and duration of capacity expansion is a useful descriptive measure of the overall 
growth dynamic of energy technologies. 
Figure 7 confirms the basic intuition of the positive relationship observed historically 
between the extent and duration of growth for 8 different energy technologies, each in 
their respective initial markets. Both axes of Figure 7 show parameters from logistic 
functions fitted to historical time series data of cumulative total capacity in MW. The x-
axis shows the turnover time which is a measure of the duration of growth (and 
inversely proportional to the rate parameter in the logistic function). The turnover time 
or Δt is the period a technology takes to grow from 10% to 90%, or alternatively 1% to 
50%, of its final saturation level. This saturation level is shown on the y-axis as a 
measure of the extent of growth (the asymptote parameter in the logistic function). This 
is normalized to take into account differences in the overall size of the energy system 
into which different technologies diffused (so is analogous to a market share metric). 
 
 
Figure 7. Relationship Between Extent and Duration of Capacity Growth 
Historically. 
 
 18
The consistency of the extent - duration relationship in Figure 7 is surprising as the end-
use and supply-side technologies analyzed are of markedly different characteristics and 
vintage. This consistency also broadly holds across different regions as well as globally 
(Wilson forthcoming-a). The technology lifecycles of refineries, power plants, jet 
aircraft, cars and light bulbs are characterized by distinctive cost and efficiency profiles, 
capital intensiveness, turnover rates, market niches, regulatory contexts, manufacturing 
bases, and functions within the energy system. But as noted earlier, the energy system is 
driven by demand for useful services. The observed extent – duration relationship may 
simply describe the dynamics of demand growth. How rapidly and how extensively 
demand changes is both driven and constrained by the adaptability of end-user needs 
and wants, which are embedded in practices, routines, social networks, organizational 
structures and so on. The inherent inertia to change in technological systems is similarly 
found in social systems: indeed, the two are inseparably entwined. 
Moreover, there are a common set of underlying mechanisms that shape innovation and 
the early deployment of technologies (Grubler 1998). These include knowledge 
generation through R&D, learning and scale effects, knowledge spillovers (and 
knowledge depreciation), entrepreneurialism, networks of innovation actors, 
demonstration activities, niche market applications, and so on (Grubler et al. 2011). A 
consistent extent – duration relationship for different technologies may signal 
limitations in the capability of these underlying mechanisms to speed up technologies 
through the earlier life cycle phases into the mass market. Thereafter, growth rates differ 
according to a technology’s relative advantage, inter-dependencies with other 
technologies and infrastructures, the size and growth potential of niche markets (Grubler 
et al. 1999). 
But the observed consistency in the extent – duration relationship suggests a trade-off 
between how much and how fast energy conversion capacity can accumulate in the 
energy system over time. A strongly supportive regulatory context for a technology may 
successfully increase a technology’s growth rate but in so doing may reduce the 
potential extent of growth during a compressed time frame. Conversely, demand for a 
technology which is dispersed and only increasing gradually may imply slow growth 
rates, but an associated potential for growth to be more pervasive. This simple 
relationship between extent and duration describes the inherent inertia of a large, 
complex, inter-related system of technologies, institutions and end-user needs. 
2.9. Diffusion in late adopter regions is faster than in initial innovator 
regions, but saturates at a lesser extent 
As seen earlier, there is a generalizable temporal pattern of technological diffusion, 
beginning slowly as technologies are introduced as new commercial applications which 
- if successful – then accelerates into a rapid growth phase before slowing and 
eventually saturating  (Grübler et al. 1999). But there is also a generalizable spatial 
pattern to diffusion. In the initial markets or regions where a technology is first 
commercialized, a technology’s growth tends to be slower but more pervasive (Grubler 
1996). In subsequent markets, growth tends to be more rapid but saturates at a lesser 
extent (i.e., is less pervasive). Mobile phone densities are 1.2 – 1.3 per capita in the 
Scandinavian innovator countries (Finland, Sweden) but only around 0.85 in the US & 
Japan (OECD 2009). The spatial diffusion of cars is another example, albeit a more 
complex one given the inter-dependencies of infrastructure, urban form and petroleum. 
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In the US as the initial market, car ownership per capita grew from the early 1900s 
throughout the 20th century; in Japan, growth began in earnest in the 1950s and was 
compressed into several decades. But by the 1990s, ownership per capita in Japan was 
only slightly larger than that of the US in the 1930s (p151, Grubler 1990; Schipper et al. 
1992). 
More rapid diffusion in later adopting markets signals the ‘spillover’ or transfer of 
knowledge from the formative phase of technologies in their initial markets (Grubler 
1998). Knowledge spillover can shorten, but not preclude entirely the need for local 
development of the conditions and institutions that support diffusion and that are gained 
through cumulative experimentation and learning (Dahlman et al. 1987; Gallagher 
2006). Less pervasive diffusion in later adopting markets reflects the long time 
constants of change in the inter-related systems of technologies, infrastructures and 
institutions (including patterns of end-use services and end-user behavior). 
Figure 8 provides further evidence for faster rates of growth in late adopting regions for 
the eight energy technologies whose up-scaling dynamics were shown in Figure 4. The 
bars show the duration of each technology’s growth in terms of cumulative total 
capacity as it diffuses spatially out of its initial ‘core’ region through subsequent ‘rim’ 
regions and ultimately into ‘periphery’ regions. The measure of duration is the Δt in 
years derived from logistic functions fitted to the data (see Section 2.6 for further 
details). This measure of duration is inversely related to the rate of diffusion: so, the 
longer the bars in Figure 8, the more prolonged, and the slower the rate of capacity 
expansion. In all cases for which data were available, the duration of growth decreases 
from initial to subsequent regions (or from core to rim to periphery). The only anomaly 
is the periphery region for coal power which is explained by South Africa’s early 
exploitation of domestic coal due to restricted access to foreign energy resources in the 
apartheid era. 
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Figure 8. Spatial Diffusion of Energy Technologies Historically. 
Notes: Bars show durations of growth in cumulative total capacity for eight energy 
technologies in ‘Core’, ‘Rim1’, ‘Rim2’ and ‘Periphery’ regions measured as the Δt in 
years (or turnover time) from fitted logistic functions. Regions are defined for each 
technology according to the corresponding spatial sequence of diffusion. ‘Core’ regions 
are typically within the OECD; ‘Rim1’ regions are typically former Soviet Union 
countries; ‘Rim2’ are typically Asian countries; ‘Periphery’ regions are typically Africa 
or Latin American countries. See (Wilson forthcoming-b) for further details. 
 
3. Scenario representations of future technological change. 
The role of technological change in future energy scenarios and in climate change 
mitigation has been reviewed comprehensively in the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report 
(Fisher et al. 2007; Halsnæs et al. 2007). Here simple illustrations are provided to show 
the levers of technological change in transitioning towards more sustainable energy 
systems. Growth dynamics in future scenarios are also contrasted with the historical 
perspective outlined previously. 
3.1. Path dependency in future technological change 
The scenario taxonomy developed in the IPCC Special Report on Emissions Scenarios 
(‘SRES’) became the progenitor of a wide range of derived scenarios (Nakicenovic et 
al. 2000). The role of technological change is best shown by comparing scenarios within 
a particular SRES scenario ‘family’. This holds all other salient variables constant 
(including population and economic growth) while varying assumptions on the direction 
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and speed of innovation across a range of individual energy technologies. Figure 9 
shows scenarios in the ‘high growth’ or A1 scenario family of SRES, grouped into A1FI 
(high emissions), A1B (medium emissions), and A1T (low emissions). Bold lines 
denote the ‘marker’ scenarios; other lines illustrate modeling uncertainties in the 
representation of technological change under a common set of scenario assumptions. 
Although none of these scenarios explicitly includes the effect of climate policies, the 
vast differences in terms of emission outcomes is striking. The A1FI scenario is fossil 
fuel intensive; the A1T scenario dominated by low carbon technologies. In both cases, 
as in the historical record, the long-term dynamic of change in the energy system is 
strongly path dependent. As a more ‘balanced’ scenario, A1B suggests lock-in at a 
differentiated regional level, for example ‘clean’ coal in China, but renewables in Latin 
America. 
Comparison of the three scenarios illustrates how the dynamics of technological change 
give rise to consistent and stable technological combinations which crowd out 
competing alternatives through increasing returns to adoption. The transitions depicted 
in Figure 9 thus proceed along mutually exclusive, alternative technology pathways. 
This is not uncommon in the scenario literature. But consistent with historical 
experience, these contrasting technology strategies result in emissions diverging only 
gradually, after several decades or more. Because of the long lifetimes of power plants, 
refineries, buildings, and other energy infrastructure, there is insufficient capital stock 
turnover in the near future to allow scenarios to diverge significantly (Grubler 2004). 
But the seeds of subsequent divergence will have been widely sown by then, based on 
research and development efforts, intervening investments, and technology diffusion 
strategies (Nakicenovic et al. 1998). These translate into different environmental 
outcomes only as new technologies gradually replace older technology vintages. As a 
result, near-term technology and policy decisions are critically important for leveraging 
long-term change. 
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Figure 9. Industrial CO2 Emissions in the IPCC’s SRES A1 ‘High Growth’ 
Scenario Family. 
Source: (Nakicenovic et al. 2000). 
 
3.2. Technology push and market pull drivers of future technological 
change 
A survey of scenario projections for a wide range of energy supply technologies 
(electricity generation as well as synfuels) showed how the growth paths of individual 
technologies can bifurcate (Nakicenovic & Riahi 2002). As an example, Figure 10 
shows scenario projections for solar photovoltaics (‘PV’) which distinguish over the 
long-term into groups of scenarios of either comparatively low or comparatively high 
market deployment (top panels for 2050 & 2100). This bifurcation is the result of 
differences in assumed technology characteristics, in particular investment costs 
(bottom panels for 2050 & 2100), as well as future market deployment environments 
including the existence and stringency of CO2 emission constraints (colored blocks). 
Figure 10 encapsulates two important findings of the scenario literature which are again 
borne out by historical evidence. First, the temporal dimensions of technological 
differentiation in energy systems are extremely long. Even the most ambitious scenarios 
depict no more than 60 EJ of solar PV electricity by 2050 (top left panel). Before then, 
and in the medium-term of 2020 or 2030, only modest, niche market inroads of solar PV 
into the global energy system are expected. Only by 2100 have scenarios clustered 
either around relatively small solar PV markets (0-80 EJ) assuming no or low CO2 
emission constraints and high investment costs, or around relatively large solar PV 
markets (100-180 EJ) under stringent CO2 emission constraints and low investment cost 
projections (right-hand panels). To put these numbers into perspective: current global 
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energy demand amounts to some 530 EJ, and electricity generation to some 60 EJ. So 
the highest growth scenarios suggest that by the end of the 21st century solar PV could 
generate as much as three times more electricity than is generated at present for all 
sources and technologies combined. 
 
Figure 10. Scenarios of Solar PV Market Deployment As a Function of Investment 
Cost. 
Notes: Left and right panels show 2050 & 2100 respectively. Top and bottom panels 
show market deployment in EJ and investment costs in $/kW respectively. Colors show 
CO2 emission constraints from 750 ppmv to 450 ppmv (shades of green) and also no 
constraints (in black). Source: (Nakicenovic & Riahi 2002). 
  
Underlying the alternative projections of solar PV investment costs (which in turn 
reflect other technology characteristics such as conversion efficiency) are R&D efforts, 
improved designs, and “debugging” through niche market application and feedbacks. 
These processes ‘push’ the technologies through ever-wider diffusion as CO2 emission 
constraints change the relative prices of energy sources and ‘pull’ solar PV and other 
low carbon technologies into the market. The second key finding, therefore, is the 
necessity and complementarity of ‘market pull’ and ‘supply push’ policies to yield 
marked differences in long-term technology outcomes. 
3.3. The supply-side emphasis of future energy transitions 
The energy transitions shown in Figure 9 take place almost exclusively on the supply-
side of the energy system. In stark contrast to the historical evidence, future scenarios 
tend not to explicitly portray alternative pathways of technological change in energy 
end-use. This reflects the current state-of-art of modeling technological change in 
scenarios of energy transitions and climate stabilization, rather than any disavowal of 
end-use technologies on the part of researchers and scenario modeling teams. Even 
technologically-explicit ‘bottom-up’ models contain little detail at the level of energy 
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end-use, instead using aggregate indicators such as sectoral energy intensity (GWh / $ 
of GDP) (Hanaoka et al. 2009) or exogenously specified indices of efficiency 
improvements (Azar & Dowlatabadi 1999; Magne et al. 2010). In other words, 
unspecified technological change is assumed to occur and is represented in models only 
in terms of its impact on energy demand; these impacts are then interpreted ex post in 
terms of technological and/or behavioral changes. Even in the rare efforts to model the 
diffusion of "general purpose" technologies, as in scenarios of a future hydrogen 
economy, the emphasis is on technological substitution leaving patterns of energy end-
use unchanged (e.g., Barreto et al. 2003). In such scenarios, fuel cell vehicles substitute 
for internal combustion-based vehicles without substantive changes in the patterns of 
demand for private mobility by road. This is in stark contrast to the driving role of 
changing and novel energy end-use services seen historically (see Section 2.3). 
A simple example of this asymmetrical treatment of supply- and demand-sides is 
provided by different modeling estimates of future investment requirements of the 
energy system under climate constraints. Table 3 compares the availability of 
investment estimates from 6 studies involving 13 major energy-economy modeling 
groups. As can be seen, total investments costs are modeled only on the supply-side. To 
the extent they are estimated, demand-side investment costs are expressed only in 
incremental terms (i.e., relative to a reference or baseline scenario). It is not possible, 
therefore, to make like-for-like comparisons of the investment implications of future 
technological change on both energy supply and end-use applications. 
Table 3. Comparison of Supply- and Demand-side Investment Estimates. 
Scenario Study Energy system model 
Supply-side 
investment 
estimates 
Demand-side 
investment 
estimates 
Total Incremental Total Incremental 
(Nakicenovic & Rogner 1996) MESSAGE yes yes no no
(Hanson & Laitner 2006) AMIGA no yes no yes 
(IEA 2009b) IEA World Energy yes yes no yes 
(Luderer et al. 2009)*** IMACLIM, REMIND, 
WITCH 
yes yes no no 
(van Vuuren et al. 2009)*** AIM, E3MG, ENV-Linkages, 
IMAGE, MESSAGE, 
WorldScan 
no yes no yesb 
(Edenhofer et al. 2010)*** E3MG, IMAGE, MERGE, 
POLES, REMIND 
no nob,c no nob,c 
(a) Inter-model comparison studies. 
(b) Non-specific, or aggregated economy-wide estimates, rather than estimates disaggregated to specific 
technologies or sectors. 
(c) Incremental costs expressed as % losses in GDP. 
 
There are two main reasons for the relatively poor model representations of future 
technological change in end-use technologies: data, and dispersion. First, there is an 
extreme paucity of end-use specific data as energy statistics are framed through the lens 
of economic activities and sectors. Whereas supply-side technologies are manifestly 
part of ‘the energy system’, end-use technologies are classified under different industrial 
 25
and consumer goods markets (Nakicenovic & Rogner 1996). And whereas energy 
provision or conversion tends to be the primary purpose of supply-side technologies, it 
tends to be – from the end-user’s perspective - an incidental attribute of technologies 
whose primary purpose is to provide useful services such as heating, lighting and 
mobility. A related, practical data challenge is the increased granularity of end-use 
technologies: compared to energy supply technologies, they are smaller scale, more 
decentralized, more heterogeneous, and many in number. With respect to building 
technologies, for example, the IPCC authors note that: “in the vast majority of countries 
detailed end-use data is poorly collected or reported publicly, making analyses and 
policy recommendations insufficiently robust ... “ (p437, Metz et al. 2007). 
The second reason for the asymmetric treatment of demand-side technological change is 
that it is extremely challenging to derive plausible and consistent scenario assumptions 
on the evolution of an extremely large number of energy end-use applications - from 
new transport and communication technologies, to manufacturing innovations and 
consumer appliances. Moreover, the modeling tools available to quantitatively enrich 
the scenarios are less detailed on the demand-side (Hanaoka et al. 2009). End-use 
technology investments are represented endogenously only indirectly through aggregate 
relationships between demand, energy price, and other factor inputs (capital, labor) (van 
Vuuren et al. 2009).  
This has important implications as it cause scenarios to diverge from historical 
experience by downplaying the driving role of changing patterns of end-use services 
and technologies. A comparative review of ‘bottom-up’ or technologically-explicit 
energy system models with ‘top-down’ macroeconomic models found that the former 
privileged supply-side decarbonization to a greater extent: “A likely explanation is that 
energy system models are relatively rich in technologies included in energy supply and 
thus see considerable options to reduce emissions” (p5133, van Vuuren et al. 2009). 
This influence of model structure on model outcomes is similarly noted in a recent inter-
model comparison of stringent climate stabilization targets, demonstrating that model 
outcomes are “a function principally of each model’s assumptions about the available 
technologies, learning rates, and resource prices” (p26, Edenhofer et al. 2010). 
Explaining the dominance of reductions in carbon intensity over energy intensity (or 
supply-side change over demand-use change), the authors note that “all models pay 
considerably less attention to end-use energy efficiency technologies than to supply side 
technologies (which could create a bias towards favoring [carbon intensity] 
improvement)” (p28). Of the five models compared, the one with the most detailed 
representation of end-use technologies (the POLES model) finds “energy efficiency and 
end-use technologies constitute first rank options to cope with severe climate 
constraints” (p58, Kitous et al. 2010). This includes rapid penetration by mid-century of 
electric vehicles and low energy buildings, with the diffusion dynamics of both end-use 
technologies modeled endogenously. 
Another recent study of energy technology portfolios in a large ensemble of climate 
stabilization scenarios found energy efficiency improvements invariably accounted for 
at least 50% of all emission reductions on a cumulative basis (compared to hypothetical 
baselines that hold technological change constant) (Grubler & Riahi 2010). That end-
use technologies and services constituted the single most important long-term emissions 
reduction option is in line with historical patterns but in stark contrast to the supply-side 
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emphasis of public innovation investments. This is discussed further below in Section 
4.3. 
3.4. Comparing scenario technology projections with the historical 
record 
Aside from this over-emphasis on supply-side technological change, are the technology 
growth dynamics in future scenarios consistent with historical experience? Or, more 
specifically, are the rates, durations and extents of growth in line with what has been 
observed in the energy system historically? One way to answer this question is to use 
the extent - duration relationship observed historically as described in Figure 7. The 
same two parameters representing the extent of growth and the duration of growth can 
be plotted for scenario projections of individual technologies. This is shown in 
Figure 11 (left-hand graph) for 6 energy technologies in 3 different growth scenarios (or 
scenario families) each described by a baseline and various increasingly stringent 
emission constraints (down to 480 ppmv CO2-equivalent concentration by 2100). As 
with the historical data, the extent – duration relationships seen in Figure 11 (left-hand 
graph) are broadly consistent across the different technologies. The particular 
technology growth projections used were generated by the MESSAGE energy system 
model as part of an integrated assessment study of climate stabilization targets (Riahi et 
al. 2007). However, cumulative total capacity data were only available for certain 
electricity generation technologies. This limited the scenario analysis to: nuclear, natural 
gas, coal with carbon capture and storage (CCS), all fossil CCS, wind, and solar PV 
(centralized & decentralized). (See Section 3.3 for a discussion of why scenario models 
are less detailed in terms of end-use technologies). 
Figure 11. Relationship Between Extent and Duration of Capacity Growth in 
Scenarios.  
Notes: Left-hand graph shows scenarios; right-hand graph compares scenarios to 
historical evidence. 
 
The right-hand graph of Figure 11 shows the same scenario data points (grey diamonds) 
but alongside the historical data points (black squares) representing capacity growth in 8 
different energy technologies (see Figure 7). Also included are exponential best fit lines 
for the two data series, and also for a sub-set of the historical data representing only 
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power generation technologies (dotted black line). The implication of Figure 11 (right-
hand graph) is that the scenario projections of energy technology growth appear 
generally more conservative than the historical record suggests possible. In other words, 
a longer duration of growth is required to reach a given extent of growth. With the 
exception of some of the low CCS data points, all the scenario data points lie below and 
to the right of the observed historical trend. 
At first glance, it is relatively straightforward to explain this pattern: the durations of 
growth in the scenarios are much longer (data points further right in Figure 11). But 
then why is this growth not to a greater extent (data points further up)? There are 
various possibilities. One is that the observed differences are in fact an artifact of the 
analysis. The consistent historical relationship between extents and durations of growth 
is based on a small number of data points (solid black line). Moreover, comparing 
scenario data on electricity generation technologies with historical data on energy 
technologies more generally may be inappropriate. Using only historical electricity 
generation technologies as the comparator (the dotted black line) substantively reduces 
the apparent conservatism. 
Although these explanations cannot be ruled out, another possibility is that the energy 
system models used to describe scenarios quantitatively are set up conservatively with 
respect to the potential for long-term technological change. As an example, models such 
as MESSAGE use market penetration constraints on technology deployment to prevent 
dramatic changes in model output as input parameters vary (Grubler & Messner 1996). 
Although these constraints are based on observed trends and realistic extrapolations, it 
is possible that over the centennial timescales of the scenarios they are overly 
conservative. This is discussed further in (Wilson forthcoming-a). 
4. Implications for clean technology & innovation policy 
In this concluding section, some broad policy implications are drawn from the dynamics 
of technological change observed historically and in future scenarios, and summarized 
as follows:  The demand for better, different, and cheaper energy services and their associated 
end-use technologies have driven supply-side transformations. Falls in the effective 
costs of energy service provision lead to dramatic rises in the level of energy service 
demand. However, energy services and end-use technologies are relatively poorly 
represented in scenario studies of future technological change.   Innovations attract end-users initially through their performance advantages not 
lower costs. These end-users constitute market niches which are protected from full 
cost competition and allow learning and other processes to improve, adapt and 
reduce the costs of technologies as a basis for widespread diffusion. Improved 
environmental performance is alone insufficient to support technologies through this 
process unless the pricing of environmental externalities affects the cost 
competitiveness of the energy services provided.  Often extended formative phases see experimentation and commercial testing of 
many small-scale units as a precursor to up-scaling and the capturing of available 
unit scale economies. Up-scaling is less pronounced in technologies which service 
diverse market niches. 
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 Spillovers, clustering, inter-dependencies and infrastructures result in strongly path 
dependent technological change. Exacerbated by the longevity of much energy 
capital stock, this means that the time constants of change in the energy system are 
long, measured in decades not years.  As a consequence of this path dependency, near-term choices define long-term 
outcomes though divergence emerges only gradually over the short-to-medium-term 
as existing capital stock is retired. Both ‘technology push’ drivers such as falling 
costs as a result of sustained R&D investments and ‘market pull’ drivers such as 
externality pricing are both necessary and complementary for supporting low carbon 
technological change.  There is a trade-off between the rate and the extent of capital stock expansion: faster 
diffusion implies less pervasive diffusion. It is unclear from the historical record 
whether strongly policy-induced technological change will deviate from this pattern. 
It is also possible that models used to project technological growth in future 
scenarios are overly conservative with respect to the potential for energy system 
transformation over centennial timescales. 
4.1. Discontinuities between historical and future transitions 
From the outset, it is important to emphasize that the policy-induced technological 
change in climate change mitigation scenarios is a major point of departure from 
historical energy transitions. Consequently, past transitions offer inadequate guidance 
on whether relying on regulation, externality pricing, and other supporting policies to 
drive low carbon growth will be adequate, and how it will affect rates and extents of 
growth. Yet the future represented in the scenarios also tends to describe a world with 
more globally-integrated markets, pervasive diffusion of information and 
communication technologies, stronger regional growth in Asia, and so on. Together 
with the driving role of policy, these differences in future context imply the potential for 
more rapid technological change and faster spatial diffusion. 
But the current dominance of fossil fuels relates to their relative cost and performance 
advantages over low carbon technologies (Smil 2003). Initially, performance 
advantages dominated in historical energy transitions. End-users in specific market 
niches were willing to pay handsomely for flexibility, convenience, safety, versatility, 
substitutability, or cleanliness (at the point of use). Other than in some specific contexts, 
there are no such obvious performance advantages for low carbon technologies (see 
Section 4.4 below). Indeed, in terms of power density and intermittency, renewable 
energy technologies are relatively unattractive (Smil 2008). Neither do low carbon 
technologies offer cost advantages under current institutional arrangements. Here, fossil 
fuel resource constraints may work alongside externality pricing to make renewables 
more cost-competitive, yet resource availability (competing land uses) may also act as 
constraints for the deployment of renewables at scale. 
The fossil fuel present arrived through a centennial process of incrementally innovating 
or - to borrow from Newton - “standing on the shoulders of giants” (Acemoglu et al. 
2009). The magnitude of decarbonization required in the future affords no such 
gradualism. But Moreover, a transition away from the energy infrastructures and 
institutions which have co-evolved with fossil fuels over the last century or more carries 
its own costs and inertias (Unruh 2000). Policy-induced up-scaling and deployment 
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without lengthy formative periods of experimentation and testing implies additional 
risks (Wilson forthcoming-b). 
Political efforts to overcome vested interests will be important. Together with strong 
public investment in infrastructure development, this has been an institutional feature of 
historical energy transitions which has consistently set innovator countries apart from 
the (relative) laggards (Moe 2010). It also seems highly likely that government 
regulation with civil society support to create and protect niche markets will be critical 
(Schot & Geels 2008). But it is otherwise unclear whether a policy-driven rather than 
policy-enabled energy transition in the coming decades will be institutionally similar to 
the historical transitions driven by better, and then cheaper energy services (Fouquet 
2010). 
4.2. Portfolio diversification helps manage uncertainties 
Innovation outcomes are irreducibly uncertain. This helps explain the cautionary 
wisdom around public policies trying to pick technological winners ex ante. Policies 
have to support a wide range of technologies. However seductive they may seem, silver 
bullets - without the benefit of hindsight - do not exist. Innovation policies should use a 
portfolio approach under a risk hedging or ‘insurance policy’ decision making strategy. 
Portfolios recognize that innovation is inherently risky. Failures vastly outnumber 
successes. Experimentation, often for prolonged periods, is critical to generate the 
applied knowledge necessary to support the widespread diffusion of innovations and up-
scaling to capture available scale economies. History cautions against overly-exuberant 
efforts to compress formation and learning cycles. The diseconomies of scale ultimately 
revealed in the history of nuclear power were discussed earlier; see also (Grubler 2010). 
Another salutary example is the US synfuel program which targeted a ramp-up in 
production through the 1980s from almost zero to a targeted 2 million barrels a day 
(some 25% of all US oil imports). The program was cancelled after 5 years, having 
spent almost $5 billion (1980$) to reach only 10,000 barrels a day, 2% of the interim 
production target (Anadon & Nemet forthcoming). 
A number of basic criteria define the design of technology portfolios. The whole energy 
system should be represented, not only particular groups or types of technology. The 
entire suite of innovation processes should be included, not particular stages or 
individual mechanisms. Less capital intensive, smaller-scale, i.e., granular technologies 
or projects are a lower drain on scarce resources, and failure has lower consequences. 
Indeed, risk aversion and the resulting risk premiums or extents to which decision 
makers are willing to pay to hedge against unexpected outcomes, are important 
influences on optimal technology portfolio design. Unexpected outcomes or risk include 
anything from cost overruns and delayed market readiness to outright failure or 
infeasibility. Deterministic models suggest optimal investment should focus on those 
technologies forecast to have the least cost in the future, and ignore the attractiveness of 
higher cost alternatives in terms of reduced risk. Portfolio theory can be used to capture 
the benefits from diversification for different degrees of risk aversion. In general terms, 
risk aversion means higher short-to-medium term investments in advanced, non-
commercial technologies, and deeper CO2 emission reductions (Krey & Riahi 2009). 
Diversity in publicly-funded portfolios should also help keep potential options open in 
the face of economic pressures to standardize and up-scale technological ‘solutions’ 
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which offer initial promise. Incumbents naturally favor the technologies currently in 
widespread use, yet a characteristic of leading innovator countries in historical energy 
transitions has been a political appetite to overcome vested interests (Moe 2010). Yet in 
so doing, technology policy should also seek to avoid all innovation risks of novel 
concepts being transferred wholly onto the public sector. 
An important, related challenge is to manage the risk of prematurely locking-in to 
technologies or clusters that may ultimately prove sub-optimal (van den Bergh et al. 
2007). This creates tension between short and long-term policy targets if the former 
reward deployment of market-ready technologies at the expense of developing 
technologies with greater transformative potential (Sandén & Azar 2005). This is 
illustrated well by ‘technology-neutral’ market pull policies for renewable electricity 
such as the UK’s Renewable Obligation during the 2000s which strongly favor the most 
commercially-viable alternative (utility-scale wind farms). These contrast with 
‘technology-banded’ policies which set differential support for technologies depending 
on their market readiness (e.g., Germany’s feed-in tariffs). 
4.3. Scenario analysis helps manage uncertainties 
Scenarios are an important response to the uncertainty of technological change. The 
large-scale, energy modeling studies described in Section 3 vary the most influential 
technological and market uncertainties across a set of scenarios (Nakicenovic et al. 
1998; Nakicenovic et al. 2000). Effort has also been made to treat technological 
uncertainties endogenously within models, for example using stochastic energy prices 
and technology costs (Krey et al. 2007) or uncertain increasing returns to scale 
(Gritsevskyi & Nakicenovic 2000). But the energy system models used to enrich 
scenario descriptions remain largely deterministic. Technologies are selected on a least 
cost basis under a strict set of assumptions. Under slightly different assumptions, such 
selections can turn out to be considerably more expensive, for example, if the 
technologies do not develop at projected rates or with projected cost reductions. 
However, scenario analysis can still be used to explore how optimal energy technology 
portfolios change under different socioeconomic, technological, and climate outcome 
assumptions. A related question is whether certain portfolios are more robust to these 
uncertainties than others. 
Riahi et al. (2007) explored how portfolios of energy technologies changed as a function 
of how salient uncertainties were represented. Across 22 scenarios, they varied energy 
demand, resource constraints, the availability and cost of technologies, and also the 
stringency of greenhouse gas emission constraints. Grubler & Riahi (2010) developed 
this analysis further by testing the relative contribution of different types of technology 
across the scenarios, and so the robustness of different technology options to 
uncertainty. Figure 12 illustrates these contributions in GtC per year in the case of a 
high emissions baseline scenario (A2r) and an emissions constraint resulting in 550 
ppmv CO2-equivalent concentration by 2100. The top two ‘mitigation wedges’ show the 
annual GtC contributions of (supply-side) carbon intensity and (demand-side) energy 
intensity improvements in the baseline relative to a ‘frozen’ state of technological 
development in 2000. The remaining wedges show the annual GtC contributions to 
emission reduction targets of different energy technologies and resource options. 
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Figure 12. Climate Change Mitigation Wedges. 
 
The mean GtC contribution of different technology options to emission reductions are 
summarized in Table 4 in rank order. The ranking of these different ‘mitigation wedges’ 
is quite robust across the scenarios explored, with energy efficiency and conservation 
the single most important option contributing over 50% to cumulative emission 
reductions over the 21st century. This robustness is captured by the dispersion between 
the minima and maxima for each technology option as proposed by Riahi et al. (2007) 
and also shown in Table 4. 
Table 4. Comparing Technology Options: Emission Reduction Contributions vs. 
R&D Expenditures. 
Data from: (Grubler & Riahi 2010); R&D data from (IEA 2009a). 
 Cumulative Emission Reductions (GtC-eq., 2000-
2100) Across All Scenarios Describing Future 
Uncertainties 
% cumulative public 
R&D in IEA countries 
(1974-2008, in 2008$) 
 Minimum Mean Maximum Mean % 
Energy 
Efficiency 
666 1695 3008 59% 9% 
Renewables 64 520 917 18% 9% 
Nuclear 64 243 425 9% 54% 
Other 72 229 361 8% 16% 
Fossil Fuels 19 177 415 6% 13% 
Total 885 2864 5126 100% 100% 
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Table 4 also allows a comparison of each technology’s contribution to emission 
reductions with its relative position in public R&D portfolios, at least in the IEA 
countries for which R&D data are available. The two right-hand columns of Table 4 
show a clear mismatch between the scenario analysis of robust contributions to future 
emission reductions and the balance of R&D investments to-date. In particular, energy 
efficiency is greatly under-represented in R&D portfolios using the size of ‘mitigation 
wedges’ as a measure of future need; the reverse is true for nuclear (fission & fusion) 
which has dominated public R&D portfolios historically. 
4.4. Policy can support performance advantages of innovations in 
niche markets 
In historical transitions, cost-insensitive end-users in specific market niches have played 
a key role in the commercial testing, demonstration, and improvement of energy 
technology innovations. But in future transitions, there are few evident niches in which 
end-users may be willing to pay over the odds for environmental public goods (with 
modern energy supply infrastructure physically separating pollution impacts from the 
point of use). The specific niches which do exist for energy supply technologies are the 
result of other performance characteristics: no fuel inputs (e.g., solar PV in satellites or 
remote off-grid applications), quiet operation (e.g., nuclear power in submarines), 
storage capacity, non-polluting (e.g., fuel cells for grid back-up). Efficient end-use 
technologies may offer operational cost savings but may face either design trade-offs 
against more desirable performance attributes from the end-user’s perspective such as 
size, power and acceleration in vehicles (e.g., Reynolds & Kandlikar 2007; Nemet 
forthcoming) or carry higher upfront capital requirements as in green buildings (e.g., 
WBCSD 2009). 
This re-emphasizes the importance of policies to create and protect substantive market 
niches (Schot & Geels 2008). Policy can certainly create, protect or incentivize such 
niches. Military and space applications are an obvious example of direct procurement. 
By definition or by design, remoteness and reliability respectively can support 
decentralized energy systems. Switzerland, for example, has mandated 100% reliability 
in the back-up systems for its communication networks, creating a price insensitive 
niche market for off-grid supply. It’s interesting to note that the US$12,000 per kW (in 
2003$) of steam engines when first introduced are in the same ballpark as the current 
costs of fuel cells, which are often classified as prohibitively expensive. Niches shield 
new technologies from full commercial competition while experience builds, learning 
improves performance and reduces cost, economies of scale are captured, 
complementary infrastructure is expanded, and efficiency increases. 
These market niche approaches sit in contrast to more conventional ‘market pull’ efforts 
which support the widespread diffusion of innovations into densely-occupied and cost-
competitive market segments. This alternative route for ‘buying down’ the learning 
curve (driving down units costs as a function of cumulative experience) by subsidizing 
production or underwriting sales (with risk or price guarantees) sidelines the evidence 
from history. Even success stories like that of Brazilian ethanol suggests this route may 
take many decades rather than years. New technologies do not necessarily need 
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subsidies if their decisive performance edge is attractive enough for users in specific 
niche markets. 
4.5. Innovation policy needs to be stable, credible, aligned, and well 
timed 
Technological change is described by both long time constants of change and the 
leverage of near-term decisions over path dependent futures. Consequently, clear, stable 
and consistent expectations about the direction and shape of the innovation system are 
necessary for innovation actors to commit time, money and effort with only the 
uncertain promise of distant returns. To-date, policy support for the innovation system 
has too often been characterized by volatility, changes in emphasis, and a lack of clarity. 
The debilitating consequences on innovation outcomes of stop-go policies is illustrated 
well by the wind and solar water heater programs in the US through the 1980s, as well 
as the large-scale (but fickle) US efforts to develop alternative liquid fuels (Grubler et 
al. 2011). In future scenarios, a lack of credibility in international climate policy 
imposes significant costs on climate stabilization as investment decisions in energy 
plant and infrastructure become increasingly myopic (Bosetti & Victor 2011). 
Alongside stability and credibility, innovation policy needs to be aligned. Policies to 
support innovations through early research and development can also be undermined by 
an absence of support for their demonstration to potential investors and their subsequent 
deployment in potential markets. Support for low carbon innovations is undermined by 
diffusion subsidies for carbon-intensive technologies. Static innovation incentives can 
undermine continual improvement. Conversely, dynamic technology standards can spur 
a continuous innovation ‘recharge’, as illustrated by the Japanese “Top Runner 
Program” for energy efficient appliances (Kimura forthcoming). As a further example 
of misalignment, the lack of effective policies to limit the demand for mobility mean 
efficiency improvements can be swamped by rising activity levels. 
Aligned policies are also systemic policies. The innovation system comprises not just 
technologies and infrastructures but also actors, networks and institutions. The creation 
of a viable and successful Brazilian ethanol industry through consistent policy support 
over several decades ranging from agricultural R&D, guaranteed ethanol purchase 
prices, fuel distribution infrastructures, as well as vehicle manufacturing (initially 
ethanol only and more recently multi-fuel “flex fuel” vehicles) is a good example of a 
stable, aligned and systemic technology framework (deSousa & Mytelka forthcoming). 
Managing expectations among the many innovation system actors is also important. 
Stop-start policies if short-term objectives not being met can undermine long-term 
innovation investments. Table 5 illustrates how different policy mechanisms may 
generate outcomes over different timescales. 
Technology policies supporting market deployment can support a build out of numbers 
of units, or an up-scaling of unit capacity, or both. Policies to support growth in 
numbers of units might diversify market niches, promote modularity, or advance 
flexibility and adaptability to different contexts. Policies to support up-scaling might co-
fund demonstration projects and field trials, streamline the licensing process for retrofits 
(or support leasing business models for process technologies), or provide testing 
infrastructure. 
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Timing, however, is important. As seen historically, the main phase of industry growth 
tends to follow a sequence of building out large numbers of units over an often extended 
period (the formative phase), then quite rapid up-scaling of unit capacities if economies 
of scale are available (the up-scaling phase), and finally a renewed emphasis on 
replicating large numbers of standardized units as the unit scale frontier is reached (the 
growth phase). This strikes a cautionary note for policies acting too early in a 
technology’s commercial lifecycle to support up-scaling (as currently may be the case 
with carbon capture and storage demonstration projects at the scale frontier). 
Table 5. Matching Policy Mechanisms to Realistic Timescales of Outcome. 
Timescale of Policy 
Outcome 
Example of Current Policy Approach 
short-term (e.g., to 2015) 
 
capital stock additions 
(some) 
 create, stimulate & protect market niches around 
performance advantages of new technologies  deploy market-ready technologies through 
credible and stable incentive mechanisms 
medium-term (e.g., to 2030) 
 
capital stock additions (all), 
capital stock turnover 
(some) 
 expand R&D investments in diversified portfolios 
designed to manage risk and correspond with 
end-use needs  underwrite many, granular and multifarious 
technology demonstration and learning cycles  support disclosure, interaction and feedback 
between innovation system actors 
long-term (e.g., to 2100) 
 
capital stock additions (all), 
capital stock turnover (all) 
 set long-term targets with appropriate monitoring 
and enforcement mechanisms to build and sustain 
shared expectations  maintain portfolio diversity to prevent premature 
lock-in or standardization 
 
4.6. Innovations in end-use technologies are important and under-
emphasized 
Table 1 provides a powerful summary illustration of the importance of energy end-use 
technologies as market outlets for innovation and change, and explains also why the 
largest efficiency improvement potentials lie not with the energy supply but in energy 
end-use sectors (Grubler & Riahi 2010). Yet the allocation of public resources is 
mismatched to these resource needs. On the one hand, public R&D investments are 
heavily weighted towards supply-side technologies. Of an estimated $50 billion global 
annual investment (in 2005$), less than $10 billion were allocated to end-use 
technologies and energy efficiency. Of the $417 billion spent on R&D in IEA countries 
cumulatively in the period 1974-2008, less than $40 billion were allocated to energy 
efficiency (compared to some $56 billion allocated to the commercially unproven 
technology concept of nuclear fusion). On the other hand, however, market or diffusion 
investments are weighted towards end-use technologies (Grubler et al. 2011). IEA 
estimates of annual investments in supply-side plant and infrastructure are roughly $0.8 
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trillion (in 2005$). A bottom-up estimate of the total annual costs of end-use 
technologies puts a conservative total somewhere between $1 - 4 trillion (Grubler et al. 
2011). The need for investment to support the widespread diffusion of efficient end-use 
technologies is also clearly shown in the scenario analysis of climate change mitigation 
needs described above. 
This points to a need to rebalance public innovation expenditure to include smaller-scale 
end-use technologies within technology portfolios. Support for such technologies in the 
past has proven both cost-effective and successful, generating high social returns on 
investment (Fri 2003). Technology policies need to adopt an integrated approach, 
stimulating both the development as well as the adoption of energy efficient end-use 
technologies and measures. R&D initiatives without simultaneously incentivizing 
consumers to adopt the outcomes of innovation efforts (e.g. promoting energy efficient 
building designs without strengthened building codes, or CCS development without a 
price on carbon) risk not only being ineffective but also preclude the market feedbacks 
and learning that are critical for continued improvements in the technologies. 
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